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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This Appeal is from an Order of the Third Circuit Court 
dated January 22, 1990, granting Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's claim, thereby 
disposing of all issues before the Court. This Court is vested 
with jurisdiction to hear and decide this Appeal pursuant to 
Article VIII, Sections 1 and 5, Utah Constitution, Section 73-
2(a)-3(2)(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, and Rule 
4A, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about October 9, 1989, Allstate Insurance Company 
filed a subrogation suit in the name of its insured in the Third 
Judicial Circuit Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1). 
The matter was assigned to the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings. 
On or about November 17, 1989, Defendant filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 14), to which Allstate responded by filing a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 24). Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum (R„ 34) and 
a Request for Ruling on its Motion (R. 39). 
Thereafter, on or about December 22, 1989, the Circuit Court 
entered its Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 41). Allstate then filed its Notice of Appeal (R. 
45), and its Notice of Filing Cost Bond (R. 43) on February 20, 
1990, appealing from the Circuit Court's Order Granting 
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Defendant's Motion. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the right granted by Section 31A-21-108 to 
Allstate to enforce its subrogation rights in the name of its 
insured is extinguished by the existence of Section 31A-22-309 
where Defendant's insurer refuses to enter into arbitration. 
2. Whether the lower Court's grant of Summary Judgment 
based on the fact that the claim is subject to statutorily-
mandated binding arbitration is proper where the prevailing party 
refused to participate in arbitration. 
3. Whether the release executed by Allstate's insured 
without Allstate's knowledge and after Defendant's insurer's 
receipt of notice of Allstate's unsettled subrogation claim 
extinguishes Allstate's subrogation rights. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant does not know of any legal authority which is 
determinative of the first two issues. As to the third issue, 
the determinative case is State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange. 27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002 (1972). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On or about October 9, 1989, Plaintiff's insurer, Allstate 
Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Allstate"), brought a subrogation 
suit against Defendant's insurer for medical expenses resulting 
from a motor vehicle accident. (R. 1-2). On or about November 
2 
17, 1989, Defendant filed it's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
eventually citing as grounds Plaintiff's previous execution of a 
full release, the failure of the suit to be one for a subrogation 
claim, and the requirement that the claim at issue was 
statutorily subject to mandatory binding arbitration between the 
insurers. (R. 14-15, 34-38)- The Circuit Court granted the 
Motion in favor of Respondent based on its finding that, because 
the suit involved a subrogation claim, the insurance companies 
were the proper parties and the matter should be resolved by 
binding arbitration. (R. 41-42). 
The Circuit Court's Order was signed and entered on January 
22, 1990. Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal on February 20, 
1990. (R. 45). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 14, 1987, on US Interstate 15 at 
approximately 600 North in Salt Lake City, the named parties were 
involved in a motor vehicle accident. (R. 1-2). As a direct and 
proximate result of the accident, Plaintiff suffered a heart 
attack and incurred reasonable and necessary medical expenses in 
excess of $3,000. (R. 2). At the time of the collision, 
Plaintiff was insured by Allstate Insurance Company, (R. 24), 
and Defendant was insured by Transprotection or Vanlines 
Insurance Company (represented by Frontier Adjusters) through his 
employer A & M Moving & Storage. (R. 21, Exhibit A; 30, Exhibit 
B). Allstate paid Plaintiff for his medical expenses under 
Plaintiff's personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. (R. 25-
3 
26; 31, Exhibit C). On January 12, 1988, Allstate filed a no-
fault subrogation claim with Frontier Adjusters. (R. 29, Exhibit 
A). Three months later, by letter dated April 4, 1988, Frontier 
Adjusters expressly denied the subrogation claim. (R. 30, 
Exhibit B). By letter dated April 12, 1988, Allstate requested 
reconsideration of Frontier's rejection of Allstate's subrogation 
claim, expressly indicating its intent to file suit should the 
insurer prove not to be a member of the inter-company 
arbitration. (R. 31, Exhibit C). No response was ever received 
by Allstate to this letter. 
On August 9, 1989, Allstate*s insured (Plaintiff) signed a 
"Release of All Claims" releasing Defendant and his insurer from 
all liability arising from the accident and expressly 
representing that no unsettled subrogation rights existed. (R. 
21-22, Exhibit A). Two months later, on October 9, 1989, 
Allstate filed its subrogation suit pursuant to Section 31A-21-
108, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. (R. 1-2). One 
month later, on November 1, 1989, Defendant notified Allstate for 
the first time of the existence of the release executed by 
Allstate's insured. (R. 25). 
On January 22, 1990, the Circuit Court entered Summary 
Judgment against Appellant, stating that "(1) This is a 
subrogation claim and should be decided at arbitration; (2) The 
proper parties are insurance companies." (R. 41-42). 
From this Order of the Circuit Court, Allstate filed its 
Appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I; 
The Circuit Court found that Plaintiff's suit was based on a 
subrogation claim which should be resolved by binding arbitration 
pursuant to Section 31A-22-309. When Defendant's insurer would 
not enter into arbitration, Plaintiff properly brought suit on 
it's subrogation claim in the form of a subrogation action 
pursuant to Section 31A-21-108. Section 31A-22-309 does not bar 
an insurer's right to sue on its subrogation rights where 
arbitration has become impossible, and Allstate's right to format 
its claim as a subrogation action pursuant to statute remains in 
full force and effect- Therefore, the Summary Judgment should be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT II; 
The Circuit Court granted Summary Judgment in part based on 
the fact that the claim is subject to statutorily-mandated 
binding arbitration. Prior to the filing of the suit, 
Defendant's insurer refused to participate in the required 
arbitration, preventing Allstate's pursuit of its claim under 
Section 31A-22-309. The Summary Judgment based on a failure to 
arbitrate is not proper where said failure was due to the 
prevailing party's own actions. 
ARGUMENT III; 
Allstate's insured signed a full release of liability 
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without Allstate's knowledge or consent. At the time the release 
was executed, and for eighteen months prior thereto, Defendant's 
insurer possessed knowledge of Allstate's unsettled subrogation 
claim- Consequently, execution of the release was ineffective to 
extinguish Allstate's subrogation rights. 
ARGUMENTS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In determining whether the trial court properly granted 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law, the Court on appeal reviews 
the trial court's conclusions for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court's view of the law. Utah State 
Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Company. 7 76 
P.2d 632 (Utah 1989); English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah 
App. 1989). This Court must reverse the Circuit Court's Order 
granting Summary Judgment to Defendant upon a finding by this 
Court that Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law under the facts advanced by Plaintiff. Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT I 
WHERE ALLSTATE WAS PREVENTED BY DEFENDANT'S INSURER FROM 
PURSUING ITS RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT THROUGH 
ARBITRATION, ALLSTATE PROPERLY PURSUED 
REIMBURSEMENT THROUGH A SUBROGATION ACTION. 
The Utah Legislature first enacted Section 31A-21-108 in 
1947, providing that " . . . in subrogation actions [the insurer] 
may sue in the name of its insured." This section was re-enacted 
by the Legislature in 1986. Section 31A-22-309, dealing 
specifically with personal injury benefits, did not become 
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effective until 1974, at which time it first appeared as Section 
31-41-11(b) using wording substantially identical to that found 
in the current version. Subsection 6 of this section requires 
that liability for reimbursement of PIP benefits "shall be 
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers." 
These provisions, both embodied in the Insurance Code, must be 
construed harmoniously absent any repeal or amendment of either. 
Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983); Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980). Further, these 
statutes must be construed with a view towards the promotion of 
justice. Young v. Barney. 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967); 
State v. Hunt. 13 Utah 2d 32, 368 P.2d 261 (1962). 
Allstate's subrogation suit against Defendant concerns 
reimbursement to Allstate of PIP benefits paid to its insured and 
for which Allstate has a right to reimbursement pursuant to 
statute. Section 31A-22-309. Allstate is required by statute to 
pursue mandatory arbitration to obtain reimbursement for these 
funds. However, this statute is not exhaustive of the remedies 
available to Allstate nor may it under the facts at hand act to 
bar Allstate's subrogation claim for reimbursement of the 
benefits. 
Defendant's insurer, represented by Frontier Adjusters, is 
neither based nor licensed to do business in Utah. Its sole 
contact with Utah was its insured's transitory presence in this 
state at the time of the accident. Prior to bringing suit, 
Allstate inquired of the insurer regarding submission of the 
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matter to binding arbitration pursuant to statute. By letter to 
Defendant's counsel dated April 12, 1988, Allstate stated that 
"[i]f the carrier you represent is not a member of inter-company 
arbitration, we would have no option but to file suit to recover 
our costs." (R. 31). Frontier Adjusters refused to respond to 
Allstate's arbitration inquiries. 
Implicit in Section 31A-22-309 is the assumption that 
reluctant insurers may be required to participate in arbitration. 
As a general rule, such enforcement may be achieved through the 
filing of a Complaint with the insurance commissioner. However, 
the facts of this case render such action ineffective. Allstate 
was forced to abandon the limiting provisions of Section 31A-22-
309 and instead pursue its right to reimbursement of the proceeds 
through suit in state court. Allstate's failure to initiate 
arbitration proceedings was justified where such action clearly 
would be futile, would serve no useful purpose, and would meet 
with no cooperation from Defendant's insurer. Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Office. 621 P2d 1234 (Utah 1980); In re Tanner. 
549 P.2d 703 (Utah 1976). The most effective and efficient way 
of dealing with the parties' relative rights where one was not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the State was to pursue a 
subrogation action pursuant to 31A-21-108. Such an action would 
ensure Defendant's insurance carrier's submission to the 
jurisdiction of this Court in its defense of its insured while 
allowing Allstate to pursue its own remedy in the format 
available by law. 
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As a general rule, Sections 31A-21-108 and 31A-22-309 do not 
conflict when an insurer pursues reimbursement for PIP benefits 
paid to its insured. However, where one insurer may refuse with 
impunity to participate in statutorily-mandated arbitration, 
these provisions must be read together to promote justice and to 
give effect to both without nullifying either. Consequently, 
Allstate's right to enforce its subrogation claim in the name of 
its insured pursuant to statute must survive and coexist with the 
later provision mandating arbitration for reimbursement of PIP 
benefits where both provisions are reasonably necessary to do 
justice in the given situation. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE REFUSAL OF DEFENDANT'S INSURER TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION 
FORESTALLS THE COURT'S AWARD TO IT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE FACT THAT ARBITRATION IS MANDATORY. 
The principles of justice and equity were violated when the 
Court condoned Defendant's insurance carrier's refusal to 
arbitrate by granting Defendant Summary Judgment on the basis 
that arbitration should have occurred. Instead, the Court should 
have entered an Order compelling arbitration and staying the 
proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration. See, e.g.. 
Section 78-31A-4. 
In granting Defendant Summary Judgment, the Circuit Court 
effectively and completely barred Plaintiff's pursuit of its 
claim by court-mandated arbitration or otherwise. Defendant's 
insurance carrier remains free to reject any further arbitration 
attempts with impunity. Further, the Order of the Court gives 
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res judicata affect to any and all subsequent proceedings 
involving identical issues, effectively barring any remaining 
rights of Plaintiff to have the issue of liability for the PIP 
benefits tried and decided. Equity demands, therefore, that the 
Circuit Court's grant of Summary Judgment be reversed and the 
case be remanded for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT III 
EXECUTION OF THE RELEASE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF & DEFENDANT'S INSURER 
WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF ALLSTATE'S UNSETTLED SUBROGATION CLAIM DID 
NOT EXTINGUISH ALLSTATE'S SUBROGATION RIGHTS. 
Defendant initially submitted it's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on the release executed by Allstate's insured, 
arguing that the release extinguished Allstate's right to 
reimbursement or subrogation. However, a clear majority of 
jurisdictions follow the rule that an insurer's right to the 
amount paid by it to its insured survives a settlement between 
its insured and the tortfeasor if: (1) the tortfeasor knows of 
the payment and the right of subrogation, (2) the insurer does 
not consent to the settlement, and (3) the settlement does not 
exhaust the tortfeasor's assets. State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 
1002 (1972); see also extensive list of jurisdictions following 
rule as cited in Leader National Insurance Company v. Torres, 751 
P.2d 1252, 1255 n.2 (Wash, App. 1988). No allegation has yet 
been made that the settlement exhausted the assets of 
Defendant's insurer, a party to the release. 
Allstate submitted notice of its claim to Defendant's 
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insurer on or about January 12, 1988, nineteen months before 
execution of the release. (R. 29, Exhibit A). The notice 
specifically referenced the existence of Allstate's "rights of 
subrogation for No-Fault benefit payments" for medical expenses. 
(R. 29, Exhibit A). Frontier Adjusters acknowledged their 
receipt of Allstate's claim by letter dated April 4, 1988, 
expressly denying the claim. (R. 30, Exhibit B). Allstate sent 
a second notice to Frontier Adjusters dated April 12, 1988. (R. 
31, Exhibit C). Sixteen months later, on August 9, 1989, 
Allstate*s insured executed the document entitled "Release of All 
Claims." (R. 32-33, Exhibit D). The document purports to release 
Defendant from any claim arising from the motor vehicle accident 
and declares that "the undersigned further represent that there 
are no unresolved subrogation claims and agree that if any such 
claims should be made, they will indemnify and save harmless 
those parties released hereby." (R. 32, Exhibit D). Allstate's 
first notice of the existence of the Release came one month after 
it filed suit (R. 25), giving Allstate no opportunity to object 
or consent to the agreement. Given the acknowledged notice of 
Allstate's claim and the lack of Allstate's consent to the 
release, Defendant's insurance carrier was not released from 
liability for Allstate's payment to its insured, and Allstate's 
right to payment survived execution of the Release, leaving 
Allstate free to enforce its right pursuant to Section 31A-22-
309(6) or, when that avenue proved futile, by suit pursuant to 
Section 31A-21-108. 
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Finally, the issue of the validity of the Release and its 
affect on Allstate's claim creates a genuine issue of material 
fact barring Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant. Therefore, 
the Circuit Court's Order must be reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Circuit Court ruled as a matter of law that Defendant 
was entitled to Summary Judgment. However, the Court erred in 
interpreting the applicable statutory provisions and rendered an 
inappropriate remedy based on the facts and circumstances of the 
case before it. 
The Circuit Court's determination that suit for a 
subrogation claim must be brought in the name of both insurers is 
contrary to the express language of Section 31A-21-10S. This 
section expressly allows the filing of a subrogation suit in the 
name of the insurers, and Allstate's actions in judicially 
pursuing its subrogation rights in the name of its insured were 
both reasonable and lawful. 
Having found pursuit of its remedy under Section 31A-22-
209(6) foreclosed and rendered ineffective by Defendant's 
carrier's refusal to arbitrate, Allstate was within its rights 
to force intervention of the Courts and pursue its remedies under 
Section 31A-21-108. The subsequent award of Summary Judgment to 
Defendant where Defendant's actions prevented the realization of 
mandatory arbitration is incongruous with the concepts of equity 
and justice and must be reversed. 
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The Court's imposition of Summary Judgment in favor of 
Defendant activates the doctrine of res judicata and effectively 
denies Allstate's right to seek any recovery on its subrogation 
claim. Allstate should not summarily be made to suffer loss of 
its claim where the Court may otherwise remedy the parties' 
failure to meet the arbitration requirements of Section 31A-22-
309. Therefore, the Summary Judgment should be reversed and the 
case remanded with directions for the trial court to stay the 
proceedings and compel arbitration between the parties. 
Finally, the release executed by Allstate's insured absent 
Allstate's consent cannot defeat Allstate's rights to 
reimbursement of the PIP benefits paid to its insured. 
Defendant's insurance carrier had actual knowledge of the 
existence of Allstate's claim nineteen months prior to execution 
of the release, preventing the insurer from escaping liability 
for the claim. With its subrogation rights remaining intact, 
Allstate was within its rights to pursue reimbursement through a 
subrogation suit pursuant to Section 31A-21-108. 
This case has potentially far-reaching consequences to 
Utah's insurance community. A large number of insurers not 
licensed to do business in Utah and having only transitory 
contact through their insureds' transition through the State are 
in a position to subvert the purposes behind Section 31A-22-
309(6). If Section 31A-21-108 is meaningless, as the Circuit 
Court's ruling suggests, then it is incumbent upon this Court to 
so notify the insurance industry as well as the Utah Legislature 
13 
so that appropriate measures may be taken. Consequently, 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Summary Judgment be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, 
-ft 
DATED this //^dav of June, 1990. 
Kris C. Leonard 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE rf 
I hereby certify that on the ' r day of June, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed a true and accurate copy of BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Peter Stirba 
Barbara Zimmerman 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Suite 1200 
Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
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DON E. OLSEN #2460 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 363-2244 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
vs . 
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. ] 
I COMPLAINT 
Civil No. , Vtf()/d/S?'-
Plaintiff complains of Defendant and for cause of action 
alleges: 
1. That at all times pertinent hereunto, Defendant was a 
resident of the State of Utah, and the amount in controversy is 
less than $10,000.00. 
2. At all times pertinent hereunto, Defendant, as a 
resident of the State of Utah, was operating a motor vehicle over 
and upon the highways of the State of Utah within the terms of 
Section 41-12a-505, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and 
Plaintiff is informed and reasonably believes that Defendant has 
left the State of Utah and his last known address is as follows: 
David P. Adams 
19326 Fernwood Drive 
Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin 54729. 
3. On or about December 14, 1987, on a public street known 
as SR15, at or near 600 North structure, in Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, Defendant negligently and carelessly caused a 
- U 7 ; . ' ; /-••- r 
C'.f 
h!LEfj 
motor vehicle operated by her to collide with a vehicle owned by 
Plaintiff. 
4. As direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence 
and carelessness aforesaid, Plaintiff suffered an heart attack 
occasioned by stress brought on from collision, and has incurred 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in the sum of 
$3,000.00. 
5. Defendant has paid damage to Plaintiff's vehicle but has 
failed and refused to pay Plaintiff's medical expenses, 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendant for the sum of $3,000.00 together with interest at the 
highest lawful rate from and after December 14, 1987, until date 
of judgment herein, for Plaintiff's costs of court and such other 
relief as the Court deems just. 
DATED this J day of October, 1989. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Don E. Olsen ""*-"--' 
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C : I T | • : 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
Defendant David P. Adams, by and through his attorney of 
record, Peter Stirba, and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, moves this Court for Summary Judgment in 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
This Motion is supported by Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
\ I day oJ DATED this iv f November, 1989, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this j ;' day of November, 1989, to the following: 
Den E. Olsen, Esq. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
)dWtu_ (aVuA 
FS6 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East. South Temple 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
Defendant David P. Adams, by and through his attorney of 
record hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of his 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about December 14, 1987, on a public highway 
known as U.S. Interstate 15, at or near the location known as 
600 North, in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah the parties 
were involved in a motor vehicle accident. 
2. The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries 
as a result of said accident. 
3. On or about August 9, 1989, the plaintiff and his 
attorney entered into an agreement with the defendant where, in 
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consideration of payment of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000), the plaintiff forever released and discharged the 
defendant from any and all claims, demands, benefits, either 
past or future, causes of action both for property damage, 
damages, costs, loss of services, expenses or compensation on 
account of or in any way growing out of the motor vehicle 
accident in question. See Release of All Claims, Vernon J. 
Thomas, attached herein as Exhibit A. 
4. The release signed by Mr. Thomas and his attorney 
further stated that the release was a full, complete and final 
release of the defendant for any matter or thing done or omitted 
to be done by the said parties and as a result of the motor 
vehicle accident. See Release of All Claims, Vernon J. Thomas, 
5. On or about October 9, 1989 the plaintiff filed suit 
against the defendant claiming damages in the amount of Three 
Thousand Dollars ($3,000) for medical expenses allegedly in-
curred as a result of the heart attack suffered by the plaintiff 
immediately after the motor vehicle accident in question. 
6. Such cause of action is directly in contravention of 
the release signed by the plaintiff and his attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND 
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THAT THE RELEASE SIGNED 
BY THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY IS DISPOSI-
TIVE OF THE ALLEGATIONS MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
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P.ule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The purpose of summary judgment is to bar the court from 
having to hear unnecessary and unjustified litigation. McBride 
v. Fidelity & Guar. Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 
211, 398 P.2d 685, 688 (1965). It is appropriate when, as a 
matter of law, there is no reasonable possibility that the 
losing party could win if given a trial. Judkins v. Toone, 27 
Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980, 983 (1972). 
Summary judgment is also appropriate in a case involving 
an affirmative defense, such as a valid release. Ulibarri v. 
Christensen, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170, 171 (1954). 
On August 9, 1989 the plaintiff executed a document 
entitled "Release of All Claims". This document was signed by 
the plaintiff and was also signed by one Philip C. Story, Jr., 
as the attorney for Vernon J. Thomas. 
In consideration of the payment to Mr. Thomas of the 
total sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), the receipt of 
v/hich was acknowledged, Mr. Thomas released and discharged the 
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def endant, David P. Adams, f,from and of any and all claims, 
demands, benefits either past or future, causes of action both 
for property damage, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses 
or compensation on account of or in any way growing out of" the 
motor vehicle accident. See Exhibit A. 
Releases are to be accorded deference under Utah law. 
They are to be avoided only if any evidence of invalidity 
offered is "clear, unequivocal and convincing". Ulibarri v. 
Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 307, 275 P.2d 170, 171 (1954): Jimenez v. 
O'Briea", 213 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1949). As the Plaintiff has 
failed to allege or insinuate that the release signed by the 
plaintiff and his attorney is invalid it must be presumed that 
it is in fact valid. 
The plaintiff's Complaint, dated October 9, 1989, fully 
two months after the plaintiff signed the Release, asks for 
reimbursement from the defendant for medical expenses allegedly 
incurred as a result of the heart attack suffered by the plain-
tiff after the motor vehicle accident. Complaint at Para. 4. 
The plaintiff also claims that the defendant has failed and 
refused to pay these medical damages. However, an examination 
of the Release form signed by the plaintiff and his attorney 
clearly shows that the plaintiff has released the defendant from 
the obligation, if any ever existed, to pay the plaintiff's 
claimed medical expenses. 
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Because the release signed by the plaintiff and his 
attorney is dispositive of this case, and because it was signed 
fully two months before this Complaint was filed, there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this I I day of November, 1989. 
McKAY, MJ&TON & TtftJRMAN 
By: 
PEtER/SlIRBA 
CERTIFICATE OF SRRV 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this J___ day of 
November, 1989 to the following: 
Don E. Olsen, Esq. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
PS6 
VERNON J. THOMAS 
v. 
DAVID P. ADAMS 
#893010107CV 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned 
of the total sum of FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($5,000.00), 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, 
VERNON J. THOMAS and PHILIP C. STORY, JR., his attorney, hereby 
forever release and discharge DAVID P. ADAMS, A&M MOVING AND 
STORAGE, INC., TRANSPROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY and VANLINER 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and any and all other persons, firms, or 
corporations, from and of any and all claims, demands, benefits 
either past or future, causes of action both for property damage, 
damages, costs, loss of services, expenses or compensation on 
account of or in any way growing out of an incident which oc-
curred on or about December 14, 1987, on Interstate 15, at or 
near Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The undersigned hereby declare and represent that the 
damages sustained by the undersigned are or may be permanent and 
progressive and that recovery therefrom may be uncertain and 
indefinite and in making this release and agreement, it is 
understood and agreed that the undersigned rely wholly upon their 
own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and 
duration of said damages and in granting this complete release, 
they do not rely upon anything told to them or represented to 
them by the persons, firms or corporations who are being re-
leased, or by any person or persons representing them. 
The undersigned further understand and agree that this 
settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and 
that payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability 
on the part of any of the persons or companies referred to above 
and who are released herein and by whom liability is expressly 
denied. 
The undersigned further acknowledge and accept the advice of 
counsel in the settlement of this matter that this is a full, 
complete and final release of the above-named parties for any 
matter or thing done or omitted to be done by the said parties 
and as a result of the incident referred to above. The under-
signed further represent that there are no unresolved subrogation 
claims and agree that if any such claims should be made, they 
will indemnify and save harmless those parties released hereby. 
The undersigned further states that they have carefully read 
the foregoing Release of All Claims, know the contents thereof 
EXHIBIT A 
and that they sign the same as their own free act, and it is 
their intention to be legally bound thereby. 
DATED this day of X- ? 1989 
f\ 
'Philip C. Story, Jr. 
Attorney for Vernon J. Thomas 
STATE OF UTAH 
So. County of 
T 0 n this / day of / n v A y ^ ! 1989, personally 
appeared before (me VERNON j; THOMAS, known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowl-
edged that he executed the same 
DATED this _J_ day of 
<t 
^V\|U( 1989 
My Commission Expires: 
ll-2[-f\ 
Noi 
Rej 
CU\ tary Publip r/ 7 
siding at: d ^ L ~ 
EXHIBIT A 
DON E. OLSEN #24 60 
KRIS C. LEONARD #4902 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First Sooth 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Teienhone: (9,01 ) 363-2244 
IN T)iK THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
) 
VERNON J. THOMAS, ) PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
) IN OPPOSITION TO 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) , FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. ) . 
) . Ci vi1 No. 8 9 3 010 10 70V 
DAVID P. ADAMS, ) Judge Michael L. llutohings 
/) 
Defendant. ) 
Plaintiff Vernon J. Thomas, by and through his undersigned 
counsel7 hereby submi ts the following Memorandum in Opposit ion to 
D e f e n d a n t ' s Mo t i o n f o r S u mma r y Ju d g me n t. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about December 14, 1987, on a public street known 
as U.S. Interstate 15, at or near approximately 600 North, in 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the parties were involved 
in a mot o r v ehie 1e ac ci d en t. 
2. As a direct and proximate result of the accident, 
P La int if-f suffered a heart attack occasioned by stress brought on 
from the collision and incurred reasonable and necessary medical 
oxpenses i n the sum of $3,000.00. 
3. On or about January 12, 1988, Plaintiff's insurer, 
AlJscate Insurance Company (hereinafter "Allstate"), filed a no 
fault subrogation claim with the insurer of the carrier employing 
0e f endant at t he t ime of the accident. 
4. By letter dated April 4, 1988, Defendant expressly 
denied the subrogation claim. 
5. On or about October- 9, 1989, Plaintiff filed the 
subject suit against the Defendant for the above-referenced 
medical expenses, said suit being a subrogation erase filed 
p ML s u a n t t o S e c 11 o n "i 1 A- 2 1-10 8, Utah Code jtoji oJ^Ht rid.. ( 1 9 e < ) . a s 
amendei'i. 
9. on or about November 1, 1989, Defendant notified 
Allstate of the existence of a document entitled "Release of All 
Claims" (hereinafter "Release")- Said Release was allegedly 
executed by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's attorney on or about August 
9, =9139. 
ARGUMENTS 
Point; 1 
Defendant's Knowledge of the Existence of Allstate's Claim Renders 
the Release Ineffective, Creating a Genuine Issue of Material 
Fact: for This Court's Determination. 
upon the filing of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the party 
opposing the Motion has the burden of setting forth specific 
facte showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial in order 
t o d e I: e a t t-} i o Mo t ion. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of C i v 11 
Procedure. The tacts herein and the documents submitted herewith 
together raise the genuine issue of the validity and 
effectiveness of the Release upon which Defendant's Motion is 
based, requiring a denial of Defendant's Motion. 
Following the accident in question, Plaintiff's insurer, 
Allstate Insurance Co., investigated the occurrence, settled with 
Plaintiff under the terms of its policy, and received from 
Plaint iff an assignment of rights. On or about January 12, 1988, 
Allstate submitted to Defendant's employer's insurer. Frontier 
Adjusters, its no fault subrogation claim concerning the accident: 
at issue, indicating its possession of "rights of subrogation for 
No - P a u 11 b e n«- f i t p a y me n t s " f o r me < j i c a 1 expenses- A copy o r s a 1 d 
ciaJr: is ati. .-iched hereto as Exhibit MA M and incorporated herein 
by ,-. •:-• fe-; ••neo . In response to said claim. Plaintiff received from 
Defendant's counsel a letter dated April 4, 1988.. expressly 
denying PI «inliff's subrogation claim. A copy of said letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by 
reference. By this denial Defendant has failed and refused to 
pay the medical damages incurred by Plaintiff. By letter dated 
April. .12, 1988, Plaintiff requested a reconsideration of. 
Defendant 5s denial of his claim. A copy of the April 12 letter 
Is attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by 
reference. No response to said letter was received by Plaintiff. 
As the sole support for his Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendant relies upon a document entitled "Release of All Claims'1 
purportedly executed by Plaintiff on August 9, 1939. A copy of 
said document is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated 
herein by reference. Said document purports to release Defendant 
from any claim or demand arising from the collision between the 
parties occurring on December 14, 1987, and declares that "[tjhe 
unde:-s igned f u rt her r epr esent that there are no unr esolved 
subrogation claims and agree that if any such claims should be 
made, they will indemnify and save harmless those parties 
released hereby." See Exhibit D, paragraph 4. 
The submission of Plaintiff's claim and Defendant's denial 
thereof, as outlined above, occurred more than nineteen months 
prior to :• Yi^ execution of the subject Release. Consequently, 
Defendant Yi^d full knowledge and notice of Allstate's subrogation 
position mo-i: e than nineteen months prior to its acceptance of a 
re Leas- stai- i ng that no such subrogation claim existed. I r; 
addition, Defendant was on notice of the unresolved status of 
A.] 1st a !.-.e' s claim as evidenced by the request for reconsideration 
submitted by Allstate to which Defendant failed to respond. 
Defendant's denial of Allstate's claim is an acknowledgment that 
Defendant knew of the claim and knew that Plaintiff Thomas had 
collected payment from Allstate under its insurance policy and 
had assigned his rights to Allstate. Defendant's actions in 
subsequently obtaining a Release from Plaintiff which expressly 
denier, the existence- of a claim of which Defendant has full 
knowledge should not be summarily condoned. Neither should 
Defendant be allowed to rely to its benefit on a Release obtained 
under such finest ionable circumstances. 
Defendant.' s actions herein suggest not only an intentional 
attempt to belated]y circumvent its liability in this matter, but 
also raise the question of bad faith by Defendant in obtaining 
Plaintiff's execution of the Release. Defendant has not properly 
avoided its liability to Allstate in this matter. Rather, 
Defendant's remedy is one of indemnity from Plaintiff Thomas 
pursuant to the terms of their agreement- See Exhibit DT 
paragraph 4. Defendant's securing of and reliance on the Rei^ a-
obtained nineteen months after the submission of the claim rai: 
an .issue of material fact upon which trial must be had in t! 
m a •- -*• e r . 
CONCLUSION 
The peculiar circumstances of this case", incdad 
r • e ;: a vi; i a n t T s p r i o r k n o w I e d g e of the e x i s t c nee o f a n u 3 i r o a a i \ 
snreaaaa r ion claim nineteen months prior to obtaining the Role: 
a;; trie existence of such claim, create a genuine issue 
iai Tact. the existence of which requires a denial 
D e fa •' n d a n t: * s M o t i o n f o r S u mrna r y ».7u d g me n t. 
DATED this r?Z„._ r^y °f November, 1939. 
MATHESCN, MORTENSEN & CLSEN 
•"Kua 
ma 
)on E. Olsen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on the p[l day of November, 198°, 
ma 1 .'• e d a t r u e a n d c o r r e c t copy o f t. h e fore g o i n g P1 a i n t I • d 
Me mo r. -i n d u m i n 0 pposition to Defendant's Motion f o r S u mm.." 
dado me n? to the fo1lowi ng: 
Pe f;er Stirba 
MoKAY, BURTON b THURMAN 
Suite .1200 
Kennecott Bui1ding 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
!AV\\ VDJ\ 
INTER-INSURER SUBROGATION MEMORANDUM 
DATE: J/hA/ lZ. / * W FILE IDENTIFICATION: 
YourClaimNo.: l3l007<20L.n n.,r«.imMn- MDO*SOLI 
Yourlnsured: farted Lea<>„« Our Insured: _ J ^ ^ > L _ ^ _ 2 ^ > ^ 
Your Insured's Address: *7 ///t,in^ Onixs 
Accident: -J-/5 N/iH-hhounl O/oo/J.) 12-H-TI 
(Place) (Date) 
L " " J 
F R O M • <§ Allstate Insurance Co. 
r ff\ VS IV I . [ j Allstate Indemnity Co. 
D Allstate County Mutual Ins. Co. (Texas only) 
r * 
MARKET CLAIM OFFICE 
5650 South 410 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84123-0000 
L J 
Signature:. 
R E G A R D I N G O U R S U B R O G A T I O N C L A I M A G A I N S T YOUR C O M P A N Y . . . . 
L I 1. Repair or replacement of our insured's motor vehicle or other property is being made under the terms of our insured's 
policy. Our subrogation claim is forthcoming. Please protect All state's interests. 
Our Investigation reveals that your insured was at fault for the accident, and: 
pfo. Payment for repairs to our insured's motor vehicle (or other property ) have been com-
pleted and documentation is attached. Please honor our claim: 
Allstate* interest: $ / ^ 7 - ^ Please send a separate draft for 
Insured's deductible (if indicated): $ / / V ) . — our insured's deductible D Yesj^No 
TOTAL: $ _ Z & 2 f L J f L _ 
D b. Our insured's vehicle was a total loss. Documentation is attached. Basis for our claim: 
Amount paid to our insured: $ 
PLUS initial towing and storage charges: $. TOTAL (1) $_ 
Gross recovery on sale of salvage: $ 
LESS fees in sale of salvage: $ 
NET SALVAGE RECOVERY (2) $. 
Our subrogation interest (1 minus 2) $.. 
PLUS our insured's deductible interest (if applicable): $ 
TOTAL SUBROGATION CLAIM: $. 
D c . We possess rights of subrogation for Medical Expense Coverage payments. Documentation is attached. Please 
honor our claim for: 
claim for: 1^^*22 i*1****S 
Medical: $ p*W,/v , EsslSef£: jh^nryu^° Surv.Loss: $. 
Work Loss: $ " Funeral: $ TOTAL: $ 
We possess rights of subrogation for No-Fault benefit payments. Documentation is attached. Please honor our 
clai  for: vefrurn *I>I*V»Q S 
U 3. Following earlier correspondence to you regarding our subrogation claim, we incurred additional expense involving the 
loss. Documentation is attached. Please include the following amount in our subrogation claim: 
U 4. Our assessment of liability factors warrants a subrogation demand of less than 100%. In lieu of the amount shown in 2a or 
2b above, a % a compromised request is indicated as follows: 
D Allstate's interest only: $ 
• Allstate's interest including our insured's deductible interest: $ 
I—I 5. Documentation of our claim was sent to you earlier. Please remit payment. 
6. An arbitration decision in our favor was rendered on . When may we expect payment? 'T* 
7. Your offer of settlement is accepted. Please send your draft. «**»**& « * sw * $
 m 
• 8. Your offer of settlement is unacceptable. We will proceed with legal action (or arbitration if applicable) unless our demand 
is met within 20 days. 
K 
MCKAY, BURTON 8C THURMAN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
W.LFORO M BURTON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
S ^ 1 1 G T T££ Y MAN *""* , 2 0 ° ^ENNECOTT 8U.tB.NG OF OOONSCL 
DAVIO P BROWN *° E A S T S 0 ^ ™ TEMPLE STREET DAVID L McXAY 
^ T s T ^ r 5 ™URMAN SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84133 TELEFAX **«"** 
DAVID L BIRO
 ( e o t ) 521.4.35 
REID TATEOKA 
STEPHEN W RUPP 
HARRY CASTON 
£ £ £ £ £ ? April A, 1988 
JOEL T. MARKER 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY. JR. 
R. BRET JENKINS 
Allstate Insurance Company 
Market Claim Office 
5650 South 410 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123-0000 
Attention: Andra N. Hogan 
Re: Subrogation Claim/Vernon J. 
Thomas 
Dear Ms. Hogan: 
I have reviewed Allstate1s no fault subrogation claim with 
the carrier for A & M Moving & Storage. Inasmuch as it is our 
position that your insured's injuries did not arise out of the 
accident, for which no fault benefits were provided, your claim 
previously submitted to Frontier Adjusters is denied. 
Very truly yours, 
/vcP 
PETER STIRBA 
PSl:kp 
cc: Libby Lowther 
Faye Strothers 
P Y 
April 12, 1988 
U C 
Mr. Peter Stirba ^- ^ i " 
McKay, Burton & Thurman ^ 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Bldg. 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84133 
RE: Our Claim Number 
Our Insured 
Accident Date 
Your Client 
1310092067 J30 
Vernon J. Thomas 
December 14, 1987 
Frontier Adjusting for 
A&M Moving & Storage 
Dear Mr. Stirba: 
Thank you for your correspondence of April 4, 1988. 
While I can appreciate your concerns regarding the related-
ness of the heart surgery to the automobile accident, the 
matter was carefully and fully investigated prior to any 
payments being made* 
Enclosed is another copy of Dr. Okawa1 s January 12, 1988 
medical report when he states "I feel definitely that the 
accident did precipitate his (Vernon J. Thomas) myocardial 
infarction, aggravating a pre-existing condition"• I had 
a long conversation with Dr. Okawa during which he strongly 
reiterated his assessment that had the accident not occur-
red, Mr. Thomas would have remained asymptomatic and treat-
ment for his coronary artery disease would not have been 
necessary. 
Dr. Okawa firmly established the relationship between the 
resulting treatment and the auto accident. Once the corre-
lation was made, we had no option but to cover the reasona-
ble and necessary expenses under Mr. Thomas' personal injury 
protection coverage. 
G 8-3 PRINTED IN U. S. A. 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned 
of the total sum of FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($5,000.00), 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, 
VERNON J. THOMAS and PHILIP C. STORY, JR., his attorney, hereby 
forever release and discharge DAVID P. ADAMS, A&M MOVING AND 
STORAGE, INC., TRANSPROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY and VANLINER 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and any and all other persons, firms, or 
corporations, from and of any and all claims, demands, benefits 
either past or future, causes of action both for property damage, 
damages, costs, loss of services, expenses or compensation on 
account of or in any way growing out of an incident which oc-
curred on or about December 14, 1987, on Interstate 15, at or 
near Salt Lake City, Utah, 
The undersigned hereby declare and represent that the 
damages sustained by the undersigned are or may be permanent and 
progressive and that recovery therefrom may be uncertain and 
indefinite and in making this release and agreement, it is 
understood and agreed that the undersigned rely wholly upon their 
own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and 
duration of said damages and in granting this complete release, 
they do not rely upon anything told to them or represented to 
them by the persons, firms or corporations who are being re-
leased, or by any person or persons representing them. 
The undersigned further understand and agree that this 
settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and 
that payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability 
on the part of any of the persons or companies referred to above 
and who are released herein and by whom liability is expressly 
denied. 
The undersigned further acknowledge and accept the advice of 
counsel in the settlement of this matter that this is a full, 
complete and final release of the above-named parties for any 
matter or thing done or omitted to be done by the said parties 
and as a result of the incident referred to above. The under-
signed further represent that there are no unresolved subrogation 
claims and agree that if any such claims should be made, they 
will indemnify and save harmless those parties released hereby. 
The undersigned further states that they have carefully read 
the foregoing Release of All Claims, know the contents thereof 
and that they sign the same as their own free act, and it is 
their intention to be legally bound thereby. 
DATED this day of x~ ? 1989. 
Vernon J . TfebiKas 
v 
'hilip C. Story, Jr. 
Attorney for Vernon J. Thomas 
STATE OF UTAH ,
 ; ) 
County of 
On this / day of /r\[/^Y^>> ' 1989, personally 
appeared before(me VERNON J. THOMAS, known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowl-
edged that he executed the sam^  
DATED this day of K\AfUJ 1989 
/ \ A l ^ A 
My Commission Expires 
Notary Publip r/ 7" 
Residing at:' u ^ *~ 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
PRELIMINARY SUMMARY 
It is obvious from reading Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts that plaintiff is not aware of what allegations have been 
made in his Complaint. There is not one single allegation in 
the Complaint referencing that this action is a subrogation 
action. There is not one single allegation that this matter, 
although being brought in the name of Vernon J. Thomas, is 
really brought by Allstate Insurance Company. Furthermore, this 
matter is brought against the driver who was involved in the 
accident, rather than against his insurance carrier. There is 
no question that if this case is in fact a subrogation action 
for PIP benefits under §33A-22-309(6) U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
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the proper party to the lawsuit is defendant's insurance carri-
er, not defendant individually. 
Plaintiff's counsel may characterize this lawsuit any 
way he wishes. The fact remains, however, that the allegations 
in this case constitute a straight forward negligence claim for 
special damages brought by plaintiff, Vernon Thomas, against 
defendant, David P. Adams, for special damages incurred as a 
result of an automobile accident that occurred on December 14, 
1987. The Release signed by Mr. Thomas and his attorney clearly 
and completely settle any such claim. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The allegations in the Complaint are not in the 
nature of a subrogation claim and therefore the Complaint must 
be dismissed based upon the existing Release of all claims 
signed by the plaintiff. 
There is no question that the plaintiff is seeking 
damages for the accident of December 14, 1987. There is no 
dispute that the plaintiff and his attorney released the defen-
dant and his agents from any further liability arising out of 
the accident. Further, there is no dispute that in paragraph 4 
of the Release the plaintiff represented there were no unre-
solved subrogation claims, and further warranted that should 
there be any subrogation claims in the future, that the 
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plaintiff and his attorney would indemnify and hold harmless any 
party to the Release who was being charged with a subrogation 
claim. 
Thus, based upon the existing allegations in plaintiff's 
Complaint the foregoing Release is dispositive of this case. 
This case as pled is not a subrogation case and there is abso-
lutely no reference in the Complaint to suggest that it is. 
That being the case, the existing Complaint should be dismissed 
based upon the express language of the prior release executed by 
the plaintiff. 
B. The express language of S31A-22-3Q9(6) requires that 
this matter be dismissed. 
Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff's Complaint should be 
construed differently than what has been alleged, and this case 
is really a subrogation case, then the express language of 
§31A-22-309(6) U.C.A. (1953), as amended, requires that this 
case be dismissed. Section 33A-22-309(6) states in pertinent 
part as follows: 
(6) Every polic3/ providing personal injury protection 
coverage is subject to the following: 
(a) That where the insured under the policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been 
paid by another insurer, including the Workman's 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the 
person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimBurse the other insurer for the payment, but 
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not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; 
and, 
(b) That the issue of liability for the reimburse-
ment and its amount shall be decided by mandatory 
binding arbitration between the insurers"! (empha-
sis added). 
Accordingly, plaintiff's Complaint is deficient and flawed in 
two major ways. 
First, defendant David P. Adams is the not proper party 
to be sued. The f,insurerff is liable for the reimbursement, not 
the individual tort feasor. Thus, even if there is an existing 
subrogation claim, it is between "insurers" and the proper party 
defendant is Mr. Adams1 insurer. 
Second, the liability that is being asserted for pre-
sumably no fault benefits that have been paid by Allstate to its 
insured, must be decided by "mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers". That being the case, this lawsuit is a 
completely inappropriate remedy for Allstate to seek reimburse-
ment against Mr. Adams1 insurance carrier. It must pursue its 
remedy through arbitration, and not the courts. 
The issue of notice is completely irrelevant and is 
immaterial to defendant's its motion. Defendant's position is 
that this lawsuit cannot be something more than what plaintiff 
has alleged in his complaint. Plaintiff has already released 
this defendant from damages sustained in the December 14, 1987 
accident. That being so, defendant's Motion should be granted. 
-5-
However, even assuming for purposes of argument that 
plaintiff now wishes to characterize this lawsuit as really a 
subrogation claim of Allstate Insurance Company, the lawsuit 
should still be dismissed and defendant's Motion should be 
granted because §32A-22-309(6) is controlling. Statutorily, 
Allstate can't sue the individual tort feasor for any reimburse-
ment, and must pursue this matter through binding arbitration. 
Under the foregoing analysis, the question of notice has 
no bearing on the Court in deciding this case. While the impact 
of the language of the release on any subrogation claim may 
become important at some future time, that language is not being 
relied upon by plaintiff at this point in support of this 
Motion. 
DATED this i day of December, 1989. 
McKAY, BUI 
Bv: 
PETER\STIREA 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC 
I hereby certify that a true a w correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
,1-fK SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this V day of 
December, 1989 to the following: 
Don E. Olson, Esq. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
MISC4/adams y\QMhAi, uiktl 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
McFAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR RULING ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOP 
SUMl'ARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, hereby requests the clerk to submit 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for ruling. All 
responsive pleadings have now been filed, and the issue is ripe 
for a determination. 
DATED this ^2-day of December, 1989. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REQUEST FOR RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this <^2iiJ( day of 
December, 1989, to the following: 
Don E. Olsen, Esc. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84102 
PS18 ^JL-MML 
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PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
This matter was submitted to Court for decision 
based upon the memoranda of the parties and the pleadings on 
file with the Court. The Court, having reviewed Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the entire file in this matter, 
and good cause appearing therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby granted and this case is dismissed with 
^ DATED this UC^a? of January, 1990. I ^  J\ 
BY THE COURT: M M / 
Michael L. Hutrchings * 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this 12 day of January, 1990, 
to the following: 
Don E. Olsen, Esq. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
PS18 
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DON E. OLSEN #2460 
KRIS C. LEONARD #490 2 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OB' UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
/' 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant, 
/ 
NOTICE OF FILING COST 
BONJBf' 
Case No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutching* 
Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules of Utah Court of 
Appeals, herewith deposits with the Court a Cost Bond in the 
amount of $300.00 as security for costs and charges which may be 
awarded against Plaintiff on appeal. 
DATED this gpcKday of February, 1990. 
Kriis C. Leonar'd 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Defendant's 
attorney on this rd[)t^ day of February, 1990, as follows: 
Peter Stirba 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
~t±*3~eQ- 7 &ZJ&>^ f-
DON E. OLSEN #2460 
KRIS C. LEONARD #4902 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J- THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 893010.107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
/ 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Vernon J- Thomas 
/ 
appeals to the Court of Appeals of the State/of Utah from the 
January 22, 1990, Order of the Honorable yftichael L. Hutchings 
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. DATED this 
g^lO^day of February, 1990. 
Kris C. Leonard' 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
ik. I hereby certify that on the rO() day of February, 1990, I 
mailed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Peter Stirba 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
31A-21-106. Insurance Code UTAH CODC 
(b) the fact misrepresented or falsely warranted 
contributes to the loss. 
(3) No failure of a condition prior to the loss and 
no breach of a promissory warranty affects the 
insurer's obligations under the policy unless it exists 
at the time of the loss and either increases the risk 
at the lime of the loss or contributes to the loss. 
This subsection does not apply to failure to tender 
payment of premium. 
(4) Nondisc losure of information not requested by 
the insurer is not a defense to an action against the 
insurer . Failure to correct within a reasonable t ime 
any representa t ion that becomes incorrect because of 
changes in c ircumstances is misrepresentat ion, not 
nondisc losure . 
<5) If after issuance of a policy the insurer acqu-
ires knowledge of sufficient facts to const i tute a 
general defense to all claims under the policy, the 
defense is only available if the insurer notifies the 
insured within 60 days after acquiring the knowledge 
of its intention to defend against a claim if one 
should arise, or within 120 days if the insurer con-
siders it necessary to secure addit ional medical inf-
o rma t ion and is actively seeking the informat ion at 
the end of the 60 days . 
T h e insurer and insured may mutually agree to a 
policy rider in order to cont inue the policy in force 
with except ions or modif icat ions. For purposes of 
this subsect ion, an insurer has acquired knowledge 
only if the informat ion alleged to give rise to the 
knowledge was disclosed to the insurer or its agent 
in connec t ion with communica t ions or investigations 
associated with the insurance policy under which the 
subject claim arises. 
(6) N o trivial or transi tory breach of or noncom-
pliance with any provision of this chapter is a basis 
for avoiding an insurance cont rac t . 1986 
31A-21-106. Incorpora t ion by reference. 
(1) No insurance policy may contain any agree-
ment or incorporate any provision not fully set forth 
in the policy or in an application or other document 
attached to and made a part of the policy at the 
time of its delivery. However: 
(a) any policy may by reference incorporate rate 
schedules and classifications of risks and short-rate 
tables filed with the commissioner; and 
(b) by rule or order, the commissioner may 
authorize incorporation by reference of provisions 
for administrative arrangements, premium sched-
ules, and payment procedures for complex contr-
acts. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or 
as otherwise mandated by law, no purported modi-
fication of a contract during the term of the policy 
affects the obligations of a party to the contract 
unless the modification is in writing and agreed to 
by the party against whose interest the modification 
operates. 
(3) Subsection (2) does not prevent a change in 
coverage under group contracts resulting from pro-
visions of an employer eligibility rule, the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement, or provisions in 
Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
plan documents. 
(4) Subsection (2) does not prevent a p remium 
increase at any renewal da te which is applicable 
uniformly to all comparab l e persons . t<«6 
31A-21-107. Con t r ac t rights under noncomplying 
policies. 
( I ) Except as otherwise specifically provided by 
this t i t le, a policy is enforceable against the insurer 
according to its terms, even if it exceeds the autho-
rity of the insurer. 
(2) Any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement 
issued after July 1, 1986. and which is otherwise 
valid, which contains any condition or provision not 
in compliance with the requirements of this title, is 
not rendered invalid by this title. 
However, those conditions and provisions shall be 
construed and applied as if the policy, rider, or 
endorsement was in full compliance with this title. 
(3) Upon written request of the policyholder or an 
insured whose rights under the policy are continuing 
and not t ransi tory, an insurer shall reform and 
reissue or amend by a clearly stated rider its written 
policy to comply with the requirements of the law 
existing at the date of issuance of the policy. Subject 
to this section and Section 31A-2I-102, a person 
seeking to reform a written insurance agreement by 
complaint or petition to a judicial author i ty shall 
show by clear and convincing evidence the existence 
of facts establishing the re format ion . i9«6 
31A-21-108. Subrogation rights. 
Subrogation actions may be brought by the 
insurer in the name of its insured. i w 
Part I I . Approval of Forms. 
31A-21-201. Filing and approval of forms. 
3IA-21-202. Explicit approval required. 
31A-21-203. Authorized clauses for insurance forms. 
31A-21-201. Filing and approval of forms. 
(1) No form subject to Subsection 3IA-2I-101 
(1), except as exempted under Subsections 31A-21-
101 (2) through 31A-21-101 (6). may be used 
unless it has been filed with the commissioner. 
(2) (a) The commissioner may at any time disap-
prove a form upon a finding that: 
(i) it is inequitable, unfairly discriminatory, 
misleading, deceptive, obscure, or encourages misr-
epresentation; 
(ii) it provides benefits or contains other prov-
isions that endanger the solidity of the insurer; 
(iii) in the case of the basic policy, though not 
applicable to riders and endorsements, it fails to 
provide the exact name of the insurer and its state 
of domicile; or 
(iv) it violates a statute or a rule adopted by the 
commissioner, or is otherwise contrary to law. 
(b) Whenever the commissioner disapproves a 
form under Subsection (2) (a), the commissioner 
may order that, on or before a date not less than 30 
nor more than 90 days after the order, the use of 
the form be discontinued or that appropriate 
changes be made. 
(c) The commissioner's disapproval under 
this Subsection (2) shall be in writing and constitutes 
an order. This order shall state the reasons for dis-
approval in reasonable detail to guide the insurer in 
reformulating its proposals or appealing the order. 
(3) Insurance policy forms need not conform to 
the requirements of this chapter until July I, 1987, 
though insurance policies issued after July 1, 1986, 
are subject to Section 31A-21-107. i9M 
31A-21-202. Explicit approval requi red . 
(1) T h e following clauses a re d isapproved unless 
the commissioner gives them explicit approva l : 
(a) clauses requiring more expeditious notice of 
loss or proof of loss than is required by Section 31A-
21-312 or rules adopted under that section; and 
(b) a schedule of reinstatement fees under Section 
31A-22-608, if made a part of the policy. This 
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31A-22-309. 31A-22-310. 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and 
conditions to personal injury protection. 
(1) No person who has direct benefit coverage 
under a policy which includes personal injury prot-
ection may maintain a cause of action for general 
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile accident, except 
where the person has sustained one or more of the 
following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury prote-
ction coverage under this part may only exclude 
from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while 
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the 
insured and not insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person 
while operating the insured motor vehicle without 
the express or implied consent of the insured or 
while not in lawful possession of the insured motor 
vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's 
conduct contributed to his injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to 
himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person 
arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while 
located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not 
declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revol-
ution, or to any act or condition incident to any of 
the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radio-
active, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous proper-
ties of nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not 
limit the exclusions which may be contained in other 
types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person 
under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is 
entitled to receive as a result of an accident covered 
in this code under any workers' compensation or 
similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or 
is entitled to receive from the United States or any 
of its agencies because he is on active duty in the 
military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party 
under any other policy, including those policies 
complying with this part, primary coverage is given 
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use 
during the accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in 
Section 31 A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly 
basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any 
period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of 
the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the 
period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the 
entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable 
proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after 
that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all 
of the remainder of the claim that is later supported 
by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid 
within 30 days after the proof is received by the 
insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when 
due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 
1-1/2% per month after the due date. The person 
entitled to the benefits may bring an action in con-
tract to recover the expenses plus the applicable 
interest. If the insurer is required by the action to 
pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is 
also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to 
the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury prote-
ction coverage is subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits required 
under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' Compens-
ation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person who 
would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability fot that reimburs-
ement and its amount shall be decided by manda-
tory, binding arbitration between the insurers. IVM 
31A-22-310. Assigned risk plan. 
(1) After consultation with insurers authorized to 
sssue policies containing the provisions specified 
under Section 31A-22-302, the insurance comm-
issioner shall approve a reasonable plan for the 
equitable apportionment among the insurers of 
applicants lor those policies who are in good faith 
entitled to, but are unable to procure, these policies 
through ordinary methods. 
(2) Upon the commissioner's approval of a plan 
under this section, all insurers issuing policies desc-
ribed under Section 31A-22-302 shall subscribe to 
and participate in the commissioner's approved 
plan. 
(3) Any applicant for a policy under the commi-
ssioner's plan, any person insured under the plan, 
and any insurer affected by the commissioner's plan 
may appeal to the insurance commissioner from any 
ruling or decision of the manager or committee 
designated to operate the plan. 
(4) Section 31A-2-306 applies to the commiss-
ioner's decision on this appeal. iw? 
Part IV. Life Insurance and Annuities. 
31A-22-400. Scope of part. 
31A-22-401. Prohibited life insurance policy provisions. 
3IA-22-402. Grace period. 
3IA-22-403. Incontestability. 
31A-22-404. Suicide. 
31A-22-405. Misstated age. 
3IA-22-406. Table of installments. 
3IA-22-407. Reinstatement. 
3IA-22-408. Standard Nonforfeiture Law for Life 
Insurance. 
31A-22-409. Standard Nonforfeiture Law for Individual 
Deferred Annuities. 
3IA-22-410. Trustee and deposit agreements. 
31A-22-4U. Contracts providing variable benefits. 
3IA-22-412. Assignment of life insurance rights. 
31A-22-413. Designation of beneficiary. 
3IA-22-414. Evidence as to death. 
31A-22-415. Simultaneous death. 
3IA-22-4I6. JReservedl. 
31A-22-417. Physical examination and autopsy. 
3IA-22-4I8. Participating and nonparticipating policies. 
31A-22-419. Insurer's purchase of and loans on policies. 
31A-22-420. Policy loans. 
3IA-22-421. Facility of payment under certain life 
insurance policies. 
3IA-22-422. Conditional coverage. 
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STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. (2442. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 7, m 
Proceeding by insurer of automobile 
whose passenger sustained personal inju-
ries in collision with vehicle insured by de-
fendant to recover medical payments paid 
by plaintiff to its insurer's passenger on 
theory of subrogation. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sa-
waya, J., entered judgment in favor of 
plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tuckett, J., held that decision 
that an insurer may be subrogated with re-
spect to medical expenses paid to its in-
sured where notice of its claim for reim-
bursement was given to other insured prior 
to settlement and which was not shown to 
result in injustice or adversely affect ad-
ministration of justice was applicable to 
plaintiff insurer's subrogation action aris-
ing out of accident which occurred before 
the decision. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance <8»606(4) 
An insurer may be subrogated with re-
spect to medical expenses paid to its in-
sured where notice ol its claim for reim-
bursement is given to other insured prior 
to settlement 
2. Courts 63ioo(|) 
An overruling decision ordinarily has 
retroactive operation although decision 
may operate prospectively if it is shown 
that persons who entered into contracts 
and other business relationships based upon 
justifiable reliance on prior decisions of 
coyrts would be substantially harmed if 
retroactive effect were given or if retroac-
tive operation might greatly burden admin-
istration of justice. 
i Court* £>I00(I) 
Decision that an insurer may be subro-
gated with respect to medical expenses 
paid to its insured where notice of its 
claim for reimbursement was given to oth-
er insured prior to settlement and which 
was not shown to result in injustice or ad-
versely affect administration of justice was 
applicable to plaintiff insurer's subrogation 
action arising out of accident which oc-
curred before the decision. 
Don J. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
L L Summerhays, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
TUCKETTJustice; 
The plaintiff commenced these proceed-
ings to recover medical payments in the 
sum of $844.64 made by State Farm Mu-
tual Insurance Company to Louise Castle-
berry. The court below entered judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant 
is here seeking a reversal of that decision. 
On November 6,1966, Louise Castleber-
ry was a passenger in an automobile being 
operated by Vernon L Hall at the time it 
was involved in an accident with an auto-
mobile being driven by Evert Dykhuizen. 
At that time the Hall vehicle was insured 
by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 
and the Dykhuizen vehicle was insured by 
Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
Pursuant to the medical provisions of 
the policy State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company paid medical bills incurred by 
Louise Castleberry in the sum of $844.64. 
Louise Castleberry made a claim against 
die defendant's insured and on his behalf 
the defendant settled the claim. This set-
tlement included reimbursement to Louise 
Castleberry for the medical expenses she 
had incurred by reason of her injuries and 
a general release was taken Prior to the 
settlement State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company had notified Fanners Insurance 
SKOUSENv.SMHH Utah 1 0 0 3 
Cite as 493 Pid 1003 
Exchange of its claimed right for reim- ation might greatly burden the administra-
bursement of the medical expenses paid by tion of justice. 
it pursuant to the subrogation provisions of
 p ] ^ tmji ifl ^ ^ mM ^ 
^
 C^
 support a decision limiting the effect of 
[1] It is the defendant's contention in the prior decision to future application, 
these proceedings that no right of subroga- There is no showing that any considerable 
tion existed with respect to medical pay- number of persons or corporations would 
ments before the decision handed down by be affected by letting the decision apply 
this court in the case of State Farm Mu- retrospectively. There is no showing that 
tual Insurance Company v. Farmers Insur- injustice would result or that administra-
ance Exchange, found in 22 Utah 2d 183, tion of justice would in any way be affect-
450 P2d 458 (1969). Tic holding in that cd. 
case was to the effect that an insurer may \ y e see no reason t0 j ^ ^ ^ decision 
of the trial court and it is affirmed. Re-
spondent is entitled to costs. 
be subrogated with respect to medical ex-
penses paid to its insured where notice of 
its claim for reimbursement was given to 
the other insured prior to settlement „ , 
V
 CALLISTER, C J., and HENRIOD, 
Defendant does not quarrel with the de-
 l l i m ^ aQam^ ^ m 
cision of the court in the prior case but it 
claims that the decision substantially 
changed the law of subrogation in this ju-
risdiction and should be given prospective 
effect only. The defendant argues that 
prior to the decision above referred to the 
Utah decisional law was to the effect that 
the cause of action for personal injuries 
was not assignable and that insurers could 
not be subrogated to the rights of an in-
sured to recover medical expenses. 
27 Utah2d 169 
Jerry SKOUSEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Alvio I. SMITH, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 1159a 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 4,1972. 
[2] Ordinarily an overruling decision 
has retroactive operation. There have 
been instances where courts have held that 
the rule established by an overruling deci-
sion will operate in the future only. The 
leading case establishing such a doctrine is 
that of Great Northern Railway v. Sun-
burst Oil 4 Refining Companyr and the Suit on promissory note. The Third 
rule announced in that decision is com- District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart 
monly referred to as the Sunburst Doc- M. Hanson, J., entered judgment in favor 
trine. The rule is based upon the proposi- of plaintiff, and appeal was taken. The 
tion that where persons had entered into Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that 
contracts and other business relationships where there was no evidence of any mu-
based upon justifiable reliance on the prior tual mistake and note was drafted and exe-
decisions of courts, those persons would be cuted by defendant, the note, which con-
substantially harmed if retroactive effect tained provision that drawer would not be 
were given to overruling decisions. An liable until and unless payment was re-
additional factor was that retroactive oper- ceived from third party on notes executed 
I. 287 U.S. 358,53 S.Ct 145,77 LJkl 360t 
85 A.LH 254; Linkletterv, Walker, 381 
U.S. 618,14 LJ3iL2d 601,85 S.Ct 1731. 
Rubalwa v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 
384R2d389. 
